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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN 
ACCURACY, CERTAINTY AND SURPRISE - A 
PREDICTION MARKET ON THE OUTCOME OF THE 
2002 FIFA WORLD CUP 
By Carsten Schmidt, Martin Strobel and Henning Oskar 
Volkland1 
The suspicion is that for all the caginess of the odd-setters, this year’s Brazil 
are 1998’s Germany—a team in terminal decline (Steve Davies, Racing Post, 
May 28, 2002). 
If you can ever write off the Germans, it is this sorry bunch (Steve Davies, 
Racing Post, May 28, 2002). 
No hiding place for Guus as Korea attempt to avoid home humiliation (Steve 
Davies, Racing Post, May 28, 2002). 
In this chapter, we present our empirical investigation of the forecasting 
accuracy of a prediction market experiment drawn on the outcome of the World 
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Cup 2002. We analyse the predictive accuracy of 64 markets and compare to 
bookmakers’ quotes and chance as benchmarks. We revisit the evaluation of 
Schmidt and Werwatz (Chapter 16) and compare our results directly to their 
findings. In addition, we propose a new method for testing predictive accuracy 
by means of a non-parametric test for the similarity of probability distributions 
and we evaluate the incorporation of information in market prices by comparing 
pre-match and half-time price data.  
We find a reversed favourite-longshot bias when analysing market prices 
before the start of the match and this bias does not disappear with the inflow of 
new information until half-time. Unlike the market based predictions 
bookmakers appear to be perfectly calibrated. Since there were substantial 
deviations in outcome between the 2000 European Championship and our data, 
we offer possible explanations for the much worse performance of the 2002 
World Cup prediction market. Consistent with Schmidt and Werwatz (Chapter 
16) prediction markets do assign relatively higher probabilities to the favourite 
when compared to the odds-setters. Together with a long streak of surprising 
outcomes this fact appears most likely to be responsible for the predictive 
inaccuracy.  
The chapter empirically tests the efficient market hypothesis. The term was 
introduced into the economics literature by Hayek. He argued that investors 
communicate and coordinate their decisions through market prices (Hayek, 
1937). The efficient market hypothesis in its most common form claims that 
financial markets are efficient in the sense that there is no persistent opportunity 
for abnormal returns based on the observation of past prices or taking into 
account all public and private information (Fama, 1970). As soon as new 
information becomes publicly available it is immediately absorbed and 
incorporated into market prices.  
In particular we test the following hypotheses: (1) the markets should predict 
the outcomes of matches more precisely than chance, (2) the markets should 
generate more accurate implicit probabilities than the bookmakers’ odds and (3) 
the markets’ quotes should be meaningful in a sense that the more certain the 
market the more often the prediction of the market should be right. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 describes 
the experimental design and data. Section 3 briefly revisits and compares to 
Schmidt and Werwatz (Chapter 16). Section 4 introduces the new distribution-
based test that provides for an alternative test of hypothesis 3. Section 5 looks at 
explanations for the poor prediction ability of the markets and Section 6 
concludes.  
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The Experiment 
The Football Event 
The FIFA World Cup 2002 was held in South Korea and Japan. Thirty-two 
participating teams had qualified for the tournament through a system of 
regional competitions. The tournament was organised in two stages of 48 (group 
stage) and 16 (knockout stage) matches, respectively. In the group stage the 
teams played round robin in eight groups of four to qualify for the knockout 
stage. The winning team of a match in the group stage received three points; the 
losing team received zero points. In case of a draw after 90 minutes each team 
received one point. At the end of the first stage teams were ranked according to 
the total number of points won from the three group matches. In each group the 
teams ranked first and second advanced to the knockout stage. In the case that 
two or more teams obtained the same number of points the direct comparison, 
i.e. the result of the match against each other, was used as a tie-breaker. 2 
Starting with the knockout stage, a game that was not decided after regular time 
was continued for a maximum additional time of thirty minutes. The first goal to 
be scored within this extra time, the so-called ‘golden goal’, decided the game. 
If a game was still not decided after the additional time, the match outcome 
would be determined by a penalty shootout. The winner of a game in the 
knockout stage would progress to the next round. 
Experimental Setup 
The market experiment used the same rules and software platform as 
Schmidt and Werwatz (Chapter 16) and was accessible from May 23rd, eight 
days before the start of the tournament. It remained available until July 2nd, two 
days after the finals. The first trading day was May 27th, four days before the 
opening match. Altogether 134 traders participated in the football markets, 72 
(54%) were German. The other traders used the English speaking portal. The 
initial deposits in traders’ accounts ranged from a minimum of 10 Euro to a 
maximum of 50 Euro. 
The number of participants is lower compared to the 2000 European 
Championship finals but the number of match markets was three times higher. 
The total commitment in monetary terms was € 3,893 with an average 
investment of € 29.05. Again, it is a zero sum game—thus no commission is 
                                                          
2 Further subordinate tie-breakers are the difference between the numbers of goals scored 
and received, with the advantage to the team with the higher positive difference, the total 
number of goals scored in the group stage, the FIFA country coefficient, and, finally, 
tossing a coin. 
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charged and all investments will be redistributed and paid back to the 
participants. Both the total number of trades (19,839) and the average number of 
trades per participant (148) are five times greater than the corresponding figure 
for the 2000 European Championship market. 
There were two categories of markets that traders could choose to trade in: 
the championship market and the 64 individual match markets. In the 
championship market securities issued on each of the 32 participating team were 
traded. The pay-offs had a winner-takes-all structure: only the contracts of the 
winning team, the “champion”, paid-off at the end of the tournament, all other 
contracts expired worthless. The championship market was the only market that 
remained open for the entire time of the experiment. In the match markets 
contract design was similar to that of sports bets. During the group stage match 
market contracts were contingent on one of the three possible outcomes of a 
match: first listed team win (1), draw (0) and second listed team win (2). In the 
knockout stage the number of different contracts traded in each market was 
reduced to two as the contract corresponding to a draw was dropped. The 
winning contract in a match market, i.e. the contract contingent on the true 
outcome of a match, yielded a fixed pay-off. All other contracts expired 
worthless. On the day after a match the liquidation value of their contracts was 
forwarded to traders through their online accounts. This ensured that traders 
regained liquidity to reinvest in upcoming markets. The match markets were 
operated for a limited time prior to a match and closed with the end of this 
match. Participants could therefore continue to trade in match markets while 
matches were broadcast live on television. This was not possible in the 2000 
European Championship match markets when individual markets were closed at 
the beginning of their respective game (Schmidt and Werwatz, Chapter 16). 
Data 
We use professional bookmakers’ fixed odds as a further benchmark for 
evaluating the predictive accuracy of the market forecasts. For games in the 
group stage bets can be placed on any of the three outcomes at quotes set by the 
bookmaker. In the knockout stage the outcome draw, or 0, is assigned to games 
that are not decided after regular time.  
We have collected two complete sets of betting odds offered by internet 
betting agencies. ODDSET data has also been used previously to evaluate the 
performance of the 2000 European Championship market (Schmidt and 
Werwatz, Chapter 16). Since ODDSET—which is run by the German state-
owned lottery—only allows for German residents to engage in betting, we 
decided to add the English agency Eurobet to control for potential differences in 
country specific odds-setting. An obvious difference is due to the differences in 
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competition: the German quasi-monopolist has a take-out rate of about 25% 
whereas the English betting agency charges roughly 10%.  
We have taken the prices from the match markets prior to the start of the 
game in order to extract the markets’ pre-game predictions. According to the 
theoretical framework described in the introduction prices in the markets should 
at all times aggregate all relevant information and expectations about the 
performance of competing teams. Therefore, the relative prices in a market 
should reflect opinion about the likelihood that the market assigns to the 
individual outcomes of a game. Moreover, we collected match markets’ prices 
at half-time. This allows us to test whether new information—based on each 
team’s performance during the first 45 minutes of play—is incorporated in 
prices and thus implicit probabilities converge to the outcome. In addition, we 
have collected pre-match prices of the championship market.  
The contract with the highest price was selected as the market’s predicted 
winner, i.e. the contract linked to the outcome deemed most likely by the market. 
We have taken the bets with the lowest quote to be the bookmakers’ forecast of 
a game’s outcome. In addition to the qualitative forecasts that the prediction 
markets and the bookmakers made about the winner of a game, we have also 
calculated the implicit probabilities assigned to each possible outcome from the 
market prices and betting odds, respectively. 
There were six match markets in the group stage with incomplete trading, in 
the sense that one or two contracts were not traded at all. For example, in the 
market for the game Paraguay vs. South Africa there was no trade activity in the 
contracts draw and second listed team win, respectively. This was most likely 
due to a low interest in the match as implied by the low number of trades—8 
trades compared to an average number of 38 trades (SD 29)—and the low trade 
volume—9 Eurocent compared to an overall average trade volume of 39 
Eurocent (SD 37)—in the corresponding market. We are aware that assigning 
not traded contracts the probability 0 might give a flawed view of the market’s 
assessment of the likelihood of the outcomes of the games. Therefore, we also 
did the empirical analysis by leaving out these matches. Because we did not find 
significant differences in the results between including and leaving out 
incomplete matches, the empirical analysis reported in this chapter is based on 
all 64 matches. This also enables us to directly compare our results with those of 
Schmidt and Werwatz (Chapter 16).  
We observed the same prices for win and lose in the championship market in 
two matches. To generate a prediction of the outcome we resolve one tie in the 
championship market (South Korea vs. USA) by assigning the prediction to the 
contract with the higher pre-match trading volume. Prior to the small final 
contracts of the contestants South Korea and Turkey were already worthless in 
the championship market. We use the higher price of both teams’ contracts on 
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midnight prior to the first played of both half-finals to resolve this tie and get 
Turkey win as prediction. 
Besides the three matches with equal odds by ODDSET and the one match 
with equal odds by Eurobet there has been only one disagreement between the 
bookmakers (Belgium vs. Russia) on the assignment of the highest win 
probability (the lowest odd). Therefore, we use in case of equal odds the 
prediction of the other bookmaker to resolve the tie when predicting the winner. 
Again, when leaving out matches with equal probabilities from the analysis the 
results do not change. In addition, we will use in the following section error 
measures that do not depend on the predicted outcome of the game. 
Evaluation of the Predictive (In)Accuracy 
Is the Market as Reliable as a Random Predictor? 
In the following analysis we will revisit the three hypotheses of Schmidt and 
Werwatz (Chapter 16) and compare their findings with the results from our data. 
The first hypothesis makes use of a random predictor, a rolling dice, as a 
benchmark for the capability of the experimental markets to predict the outcome 
of uncertain events. We have obtained empirical data on the outcomes of 
matches in 13 past World Cups from www.fifa.com. The documentation is 
incomplete for the earlier tournaments in the sense that there is no reference to 
the first listed team in the official FIFA fixtures. We find 29.5% drawn matches 
in the group stage and the remaining 70.5% distributed over the two other 
outcomes. Andersson (Chapter 15) finds the teams listed first to be 
systematically higher ranked and to win more often compared to the teams listed 
second. Thus the two outcomes are not equally likely. In order to defend the 
applicability of the benchmark random dice model, we will use a thought model 
that randomly assigns the team of record, i.e. the team from which perspectives 
win or lose is defined. In fact, our following evaluation does not depend on the 
order of the fixtures. Hence, H0 states the markets deliver uninformed, random 
predictions. 
Let Xn be the number of correct predictions in n trials. We need to derive the 
distribution of Xn under the null hypothesis. Since 48 markets were based on 
three outcomes and 16 markets on two outcomes, Xn = Y48 + Z16 is the sum of 
two binomial distributions with Y48 ~ Bin(48,1/3) and Z16 ~ Bin(16,1/2). We can 
reject H0 in favour of H1 with a one-sided test at a 5% significance level if we 
have 31 or more correct predictions. 
The match markets correctly predicted the outcome of a match in 34 out of 
64 cases. The championship market generated 32 correct predictions. The match 
markets at half-time (HT) performed best with 35 correct predictions. We can  
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Table 1. Relative frequency of correct predictions.  
 Group stage Knockout stagea Total 
Match market .50* .63 .53* 
Match market HT .54** .56 .54* 
Championship market .46* .63 .50* 
ODDSET .48* .50 .48* 
Eurobet .46* .50 .47* 
N 48 16 64 
* Significantly different from chance at the 5% level, ** significantly different from 
chance at the 1% level. 
a Match markets allowed in the knockout stage for betting on first listed team win and 
second listed team win only. 
 
reject the null hypothesis that the match market and the championship market is 
an uninformed, random predictor on a conventional significance level. 
Does the Market Beat the Odds? 
Compared to the data of the 2000 European Championship markets, the 
2002 World Cup markets’ and the bookmakers’ predictive performance were 
rather poor. Again, the prediction of the outcome—which is the event having 
the highest price in the markets and the one possessing the lowest odds with the 
bookmakers—is not different across markets and bookmakers. ODDSET and 
Eurobet correctly predicted 31 and 30 out of 64 matches, respectively. It should 
however be noted that in the knockout stage odd-setters have a disadvantage 
since they allow for three different outcomes. The distribution of Xn under the 
null hypothesis now reads X64 ~ Bin(64,1/3) and Ho can be rejected at a 
significance level of 5% having 29 or more correct predictions. Thus both odds-
setters’ predictions are significantly different from the predictions of a random 
dice. Table 1 provides frequencies of correct predictions for the group stage, the 
knockout stage and all matches.  
Next we make use of the extra information inherent in the magnitude of the 
markets’ predictions in order to evaluate whether the markets were able to 
generate superior forecasts when compared to the bookmakers as a benchmark. 
The first measure we employ is the mean squared prediction loss. 
[ ]∑
=
−=
n
i
ii PYn
MSPL
1
2*
2
1  
For each game i the squared prediction error can take on values from 0, if a 
game is correctly predicted (Yi=1) with probability Pi*=1, to 1, if a game is 
incorrectly predicted (Yi=0) with probability Pi*=1. The set of predictions that 
yields the lowest MSPL is hence considered superior. The above formula gives 
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the definition of the MSPL with 2 outcomes—Schmidt and Werwatz (Chapter 
16) provide the definition of the MSPL with three outcomes. 
The MSPL is higher in the championship market and the match market when 
compared to the bookmakers’ predictions. The implicit predictions generated 
from ODDSET’s quotes yielded the lowest MSPL of 0.249 with Eurobet 
relatively close at 0.256. The championship market had the highest error of 
0.339 and the match market had an error of 0.300. Only after the first half of 
games was the match market able to somewhat narrow the gap with the 
bookmakers; the half-time mean squared prediction loss of the match markets is 
0.268. 
These results are in contrast to the 2000 European Championship data 
reported by Schmidt and Werwatz (Chapter 16). In their study the match market 
was found to be superior to the championship market and to the bookmaker 
ODDSET in terms of MSPL. The bookmakers’ predictive accuracy has been 
rather constant over the tournaments with a slight improvement for ODDSET 
from 0.272 in 2000 to 0.249 in 2002.  
As a second measure of forecast accuracy we employed the mean 
logarithmic score (MLS), which has been applied in other studies on prediction 
markets by, for example, Pennock et al. (2001) and Debnath et al. (2003). 
∑
=
=
n
i
R
iPn
MLS
1
log1  
Although both are measures of forecast accuracy, the MSPL and the MLS 
start from two different focal points. MLS is based on the probability assigned 
to the ex-post realisation PR of match i rather than on the ex-ante prediction 
delivered by the highest probability. Therefore, it does not measure the 
(in)accuracy of a prediction about the anticipated winners, like MSPL, but rather 
the (in)accuracy of a prediction about the actual winners.  
The MLS is defined with 0 being the maximum and negative infinity the 
minimum. Higher scores (scores closer to zero) are considered superior. The 
lower the score’s value turns out to be the higher is the surprise of the market or 
bookmaker about the outcome. The results of our MLS calculation are reported 
in Table 2. For a comparison we also calculated the corresponding MLS values 
for the 2000 European Championship: -0.624 for the match markets and -0.980 
for ODDSET respectively.3 
                                                          
3  We cannot provide a MLS for the championship markets, since the information 
obtainable from its prices allows for a statement about the anticipated winner only and 
not for a complete probability distribution over all three possible outcomes. To be more 
precise, the relative prices of two teams’ contracts in the championship market do yield a 
probability assigned to the anticipated winner—the team with the higher contract price—
but they do not yield a probability assigned to the outcome draw unless the two contracts 
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Table 2. Mean squared prediction loss (MSPL), mean logarithmic score (MLS) and Brier 
score (BS). 
  MSPL MLS BS 
Match Market 0.300 -1.068 .629 
Match Market half-time 0.268 -0.974 .574 
Championship Market 0.339 n.a. n.a. 
ODDSET 0.249 -1.001 .588 
Eurobet 0.256 -1.006 .593 
N 64 64 64 
 
The market’s MLS in 2002 is lower than the MLS for the two bookmakers if 
we consider all matches. This finding is reversed when compared to the 2000 
European Championship data. Again, ODDSET’s predictive performance with 
respect to MLS has been rather constant across tournaments. Thus, both 
measures, the MSPL and the MLS, consistently provide evidence for predictive 
inaccuracy of the 2002 World Cup finals prediction market. 
In addition, we also computed the Brier score, which is the standard 
methodology for assessing probabilistic forecasts (see Yates, 1990). 
( )∑∑
= =
−=
n
i
S
s
sisi YPn
BS
1 1
21  
For each possible outcome of the game S (first listed team win, draw and 
second listed team win) a squared error of its realisation Ysi (1 if outcome 
occurred, 0 otherwise) and its assigned probability Psi is aggregated. This 
parameter is averaged across matches i. Forrest et al. (2005) and Andersson 
(Chapter 15) report the Brier score for win, draw and lose separately. For a 
comparison with the Brier scores reported in Table 2 one has to aggregate their 
Brier score values over the three events.  
The magnitude of the brier score is consistent with the results of the MSPL 
and the MLS. The prediction market before the start of the match performed 
worst (.629) and improved until half-time (.574). The bookmakers’ Brier scores 
(.588 and .593, respectively) are lower compared to the market before the match. 
Again, the bookmakers are in a disadvantage by allowing for three outcomes in 
the 16 matches of the knockout stage compared to the two outcomes of the 
prediction market. 
                                                                                                                                 
were traded at the exact same price. There is no such case in the 2002 World Cup market 
data. Therefore, we leave out this type of markets from the MLS analysis. 
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Table 3. Logit fit of the determinants of predictive success. 
 Match 
marketa 
Match 
market HT a
Champion- 
ship marketa
ODDSETa Eurobeta 
Constant -1.167 
(1.290) 
-2.483 
(1.181)* 
-2.589 
(1.529) 
-3.900 
(1.477)** 
-3.558 
(1.344)** 
P*m,i 1.887 
(1.851) 
3.916 
(1.704)* 
3.161 
(1.831) 
7.688 
(2.914)** 
6.678 
(2.559)** 
N 64 64 64 64 64 
Psydo R2 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.09 
* Significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
a Deependent variable: Ym,I: 1—if contract with highest implicit probability predicted the 
outcome correctly, 0—otherwise. 
 
Determinants of Predictive (In)Accuracy 
The next stage of the analysis is to identify variables that influence the 
accuracy of the market predictions. Assuming some forecasting power in the 
market predictions we should find that the more certain the market was the more 
often its predictions were correct. To this end, we follow Schmidt and Werwatz 
(Chapter 16) in using a logistic regression to quantify the effect of certainty on 
forecast accuracy for the championship market and the bookmakers. The results 
are reported in Table 3. It turns out that certainty—measured as the magnitude 
Pi* of the contract with the highest probability—has a significant effect on the 
two bookmakers’ predictions. This is not the case with pre-match predictions of 
the market; only at half-time the degree of certainty has a significant effect. 
Once again, these findings from the 2002 World Cup prediction market are not 
in line with the results of the 2000 European Championship market. 
A Distribution-Based Test for Predictive (In)Accuracy 
In this section we use a novel approach for testing the accuracy of market-
generated predictions which tries to integrate the prediction of the outcome and 
the certainty of the prediction. The test can be seen as an extension of Pennock 
et al. (2001) who sorted market predictions according to their prediction 
probability into different buckets. With each of the buckets they ran a binomial 
test with the average prediction probability as base probability.  
Instead of grouping into buckets we order all different contracts—win, draw 
and lose—according to their assigned probability and give the value 1 to the 
winning contracts and 0 otherwise. The collection of all different contracts with 
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their assigned values of 0 or 1 reflects a pseudo probability density function 
(pdf) of the distribution of the paying-off contracts. If we move along the 
probability spectrum from 0 to 1 and add up the assigned binary values of the 
contracts we get a trace of the cumulative frequency of the 64 contracts that 
actually paid-off. In other words, the cumulative frequency of success mimics 
the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the distribution of the 64 paying-off 
contracts among the total number of different contracts. This pseudo cdf is a 
step function that makes 64 jumps of constant height of 1/64, each at a point 
within the probability spectrum that corresponds to one of the 64 paying-off 
contracts. In what follows, we will refer to this pdf and cdf as the actual 
distribution of success, since it mirrors the way the tournament has evolved ex-
post. If predictions were accurate, then from the segment of the probability 
spectrum around .10 about one in ten contracts should have won, two out of ten 
contracts around .20, and so on. We call this the actual cdf. 
A second distribution will be called the theoretical distribution, since it 
mirrors the way that the prediction markets and the bookmakers have 
theoretically (ex-ante) anticipated the tournament to evolve. We assign to each 
different contract the value of its market- or odds-setter determined probability. 
Naturally, the resulting cdf has many more jumps than the actual cdf, each of 
unequal height. A jump occurs at each value from the probability spectrum of 
the three (two) different outcomes of the 64 events. The height of this jump is 
determined by the value of the probability assigned to the particular contract. 
Predictive accuracy is positively related to similarity in shape and, hence, the 
closeness of the actual and the theoretical cdf. 
We introduce a third distribution in order to reconsider some results from 
earlier sections that used the random predictor as a benchmark for predictive 
accuracy. It assumes that there is absolutely no predictive power in markets’ and 
bookmakers’ implicit probabilities. We call it the agnostic distribution, since it 
assigns the same probability to all different contracts. The height of the jumps of 
the agnostic cdf is constant at the value 1/N, with N being the total number of 
different contracts. Since the markets allow for two different contracts in the 
knockout stage and the bookmakers for three we get N=176 for the markets’ cdf 
and N=192 for the bookmakers’ cdf. Again, each jump occurs at the market or 
bookmaker assigned probability. 
We observe that the distribution of the probabilities the markets assigned to 
events ranges from 0 to 1—when not considering the 6 matches with incomplete 
contracts the range is 0.01 to 0.97—whereas the distribution of the bookmakers’ 
implicit probabilities is less extreme. Eurobet issued quotes with an implicit 
probability from 0.04 to 0.82 whilst ODDSET seems to publish the most 
conservative quotes with values ranging from 0.08 to 0.73 (compare x-axis, 
Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Actual-, theoretical- and agnostic cdf of the distribution of successes. Predictive 
accuracy is positively related to similarity in shape and closeness of the theoretical and 
the actual cdf. 
 
The convex shape of the markets’ theoretical cdf displayed in Figure 1 in 
both upper panels provides evidence for a too high concentration of implicit 
probabilities at the very high and very low end of the probability spectrum. 
Furthermore, this high degree of certainty in the markets’ assigned probabilities 
implies a relatively flat increase of the cdf over the middle range of probability. 
This appears to be because extreme positions tend to drive out conservative  
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Table 4. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of the similarity of the cumulative distribution. 
Hypothesis Match marketa Match market HTa ODDSETa Eurobeta 
1 theoretical vs. agnostic 0.341*** 0.341*** 0.177** 0.193*** 
2 actual vs. agnostic 0.210*** 0.256*** 0.224*** 0.198*** 
3 theoretical vs. actual 0.296*** 0.205*** 0.068 0.089 
 N 176 176 192 192 
** Significant at the 1% level, *** significant at the 0.1% level. 
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic D 
 
mid-range bets. As a consequence, the degree of certainty in the markets 
influences the degree of convexity of the theoretical cdf. 
In other words the market participants systematically over-estimated very 
likely outcomes and under-estimated very unlikely outcomes. This observation 
provides evidence for the presence of a reversed favourite-longshot bias in 
markets’ prices, stating that bettors overestimate the favourites’ probability of 
winning and underestimate the longshots’ probability of winning. The reversed 
favourite-longshot biased can be observed for the markets at half-time as well 
meaning that the inflow of new information does not drive out the bias. This 
bias cannot be observed for the bookmakers’ quotes. 
In the next step we formally test the closeness and similarity of shape of the 
three different distributions. If the realisation of the football tournament is not 
different from a rolling dice we should not find a significant difference between 
the agnostic and the actual cumulative distribution. If the markets and 
bookmakers predict well, we should not find significant differences between the 
theoretical and the actual cumulative distribution. If the markets and 
bookmakers do not take any information into account we should not find 
significant differences between the theoretical and the agnostic distribution. We 
formulate the following hypotheses: 
H1: The market’s/bookmakers’ prediction is not systematically different than 
would be predicted by a random predictor (theoretical vs. agnostic). 
H2: The actual realisation is not systematically different than would be predicted 
by a random predictor (actual vs. agnostic). 
H3: The market’s/bookmakers’ prediction is not systematically different from the 
actual realisation (theoretical vs. actual). 
We use a Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test.4 The results of 
the hypothesis tests are provided in Table 4. We can reject the first hypothesis 
                                                          
4 We are aware of the fact that the three (two) contracts of a match are not iid and 
significance levels might be inflated. An alternative way to proceed is to consider one of 
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for all sources and find that the market prediction and the bookmakers’ quotes 
do differ from a random predictor. We can reject the second hypothesis and find 
that the actual realisation of the tournament’s outcomes is different from rolling 
a dice. Finally, we are unable to reject the third hypothesis for the two 
bookmakers, thus we are not able to find significant differences between 
bookmakers’ predictions and actual realisation. This is not the case with the 
markets, which observe significant differences between the distribution of the 
prediction and actual realization. The two lower panels of Figure 1 visualise the 
test results: bookmakers’ actual and theoretical cdf appear to be quite similar 
across the full range of the probability spectrum. The bookmakers seem to be 
perfectly calibrated, whereas the markets are biased when considering very low 
and very large probabilities. In general, the rather close correspondence between 
the test results from our new method with the findings of the previous sections 
mutually confirms our results. 
Two Explanations for the Predictive (In)Accuracy 
Prior beliefs 
The rather poor predictive accuracy appears to be evidence against the 
functioning of the markets as an information aggregation mechanism that is able 
to accurately predict the outcomes of uncertain events. However, previous 
studies on laboratory experiments and prediction markets have, in the majority 
of cases, presented highly convincing results in favour of the information 
aggregation potential of the markets (Plott and Sunder, 1988, Sunder, 1995, 
Hanson, 1998; Gruca et al., 2003). Besides, a substantial fraction of traders in 
the 2002 markets had already participated in the 2000 European Championship 
experiment. This casts further doubt on the idea of a structural problem of the 
markets’ design.  
A remaining hypothesis is that the 2002 World Cup markets were able to 
accumulate and to process the information held by the participants, but that 
traders were just collectively wrong too often. Gruca et al. (2003) have used a 
prediction market in a laboratory experiment in order to examine the 
relationship between the aggregation of trader information and the accuracy of a  
                                                                                                                                 
the three outcomes only. Since the FIFA fixtures of first listed team win and second listed 
team win are not random it is not possible to provide a unique agnostic cdf. We have 
tested hypothesis 3 for all three possible outcomes separately. We find the D statistic of 
the K-S test in the match market (at half-time) for first listed team win 0.297** (0.156), 
draw 0.271* (0.229) and second listed team win 0.219+ (0.266*). There are no significant 
differences when comparing the distribution of the cdf of actual outcome to bookmakers’ 
predictions. 
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Figure 2. “What is the likelihood a team will win the championships?” Selected teams 
from the self-reported subject questionnaire filled out at the first login and prior to the 
start of the tournament. 
 
forecast of new product success. The authors find a high degree of effectiveness 
in aggregating information but a relatively bad forecast accuracy. They could 
not verify a strong relationship between the degree of aggregation and 
forecasting accuracy and therefore promote a careful distinction between these 
two outwardly similar concepts. 
In order to determine whether traders were collectively wrong we will 
evaluate the a priori expectations of traders. A questionnaire was presented to 
the subjects when they logged in for the very first time. Since we decided to ask 
for prior beliefs before the first match only, we are left with responses from 70 
out of 134 traders. We asked them to rate the probability a team will be the 
overall champion from -5 (very small) to 5 (very big). Figure 2 displays selected 
teams.  
It turns out that not many of the traders’ prior beliefs were confirmed by 
subsequent match outcomes. The traders in our experiment appear to have had 
difficulties in judging the prospects of seemingly strong teams. The most 
prominent example of a “surprise team” was the defending champion France, 
who failed to score in their three group matches and who consequently did not 
qualify for the knockout stage. The probability of a victory for France in the 
opening match against Senegal was set at 75% by the match market before kick-
off. For the record, France took its assigned 9% chance and lost this game. One 
might ask whether the traders reacted upon the observed performance of a team 
over the course of the tournament and adjusted their expectations accordingly.  
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Table 5. Odds for the 2002World Cup winner published three days in advance of the start 
of the tournament. 
 Bet365 Bet Direct Coral Hills Ladbrokes 
France 7-2 3 4 3 3 
Argentina 5 9-2 9-2 9-2 9-2 
Italy 9-2 5 5 5 5 
Brazil 11-2 6 6 11-2 6 
England 14 14 10 9 9 
Germany 14 12 14 16 20 
Cameroon 33 40 40 25 33 
Source: Racing Post World Cup 2002 Preview Pull-out. May 28, 2002. 
 
However, a second look at the probability assigned to a victory of the 
obviously weak French in the two subsequent group matches does not imply 
such expectation-revising behaviour: it was 77% in the match against Uruguay 
(final outcome 0:0, 14%), and 73% in the match against Denmark (final 
outcome 0:2, 12%). The market remained uncritically certain that the French 
would still qualify from the group. 
There is, however, another aspect that supports the idea of a collectively 
wrong perception about the matches and their likely outcomes that does not 
contradict our assumption of a well functioning information aggregation 
mechanism. In more than 90% of the games the predictions of the match 
markets as well as bookmakers hinted at the exact same outcome. Recall that the 
bookmakers in our sample represent experts from two different countries. Since 
the numbers of correctly predicted outcomes are also more or less stable across 
prediction markets and bookmakers we might say that traders and experts did all 
share essentially the same a priori information and both equally surprised by the 
final outcomes. 
On May 28th, 2002, three days before the start of the tournament, the British 
sports betting journal Racing Post published a pull-out with all tournament 
related bets offered by British betting agencies. Total betting turnover was said 
to dwarf any other sporting event with an estimated ₤200m staked in the UK, 
twice the 2000 European Championship total.5 Given this enormous financial 
outlay we believe that UK betting agencies qualified as experts on the upcoming 
event. Table 5 shows a selection of the quotes of the tournament’s extended set 
of favourites published in the pull-out in order to sketch the a priori consensus 
opinion of most experts. There is no disagreement between bookmakers and 
only slight disagreement between market participants and bookmakers. For 
example market traders identified Argentina as the tournament favourite and  
                                                          
5 In Racing Post World Cup 2002 Preview Pull-out. May 28, 2002. 
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Table 6. Correlations of the degree of certainty measured as probability of the favourite 
across market’s and bookmakers’ predictions. 
Probability of win by the
favourite P*i 
Correlations (lower part) 
Match 
market 
Match 
market 
half-time
Champ- 
ionship 
market 
ODDSET Eurobet 
Mean (SD) .67 (.13) .67 (.16) .82 (.15) .50. (.10) .52 (.12) 
Median  .71 .67 .86 .51 .49 
N 64 64 64 64 64 
Match market 1     
Match market half-time .67 1    
Championship market .50 .32 1   
ODDSET .53 .33 .66 1  
Eurobet .43 .25 .62 .95 1 
 
bookmakers the then-defending champion France. Nevertheless, neither France 
nor Argentina did well in the 2002 World Cup. To this end we are convinced 
that there was a big surprise element about the actual outcomes among 
bookmakers and traders. 
Biased quantitative predictions, preferences for the favourite and 
commissions 
The next part of the investigation is to establish the markets’ relatively poor 
accuracy with respect to the bookmakers’ quotes on a quantitative level. The 
bookmakers do not appear to have been able to aggregate more or “better” 
information given their equally low numbers of correctly predicted outcomes. 
The markets and the bookmakers predicted the same outcomes in more than 
90% of the matches. As a consequence, their respective number of incorrect 
predictions is also approximately the same. Nevertheless, the markets’ MSPL is 
considerably higher than bookmakers’ prediction error. Recall that the MSPL 
rewards and punishes a high degree of certainty in case of a correct prediction 
and in case of a false prediction, respectively. With the many incorrect 
predictions at hand, a more conservative approach is likely to have been 
rewarded. Therefore, we believe that the prediction markets on football are more 
certain by assigning higher probabilities to their anticipated winners. This effect 
should be strongest in the championship market that has produced the highest 
MSPL over the whole tournament (see Table 3). However, it should be 
intuitively clear that the average certainty is the highest in the championship 
market, since its win-lose prediction guarantees a minimum probability of .5 to 
an anticipated winner. The bookmakers on the other hand have been less certain  
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Table 7. Number of games and MSPL forecast error by correctly and incorrectly 
predicted games, European Championship 2000 experiment for comparison. 
  World Cup 2002 European 
Championship 
2000a 
 Prediction N MSPL N MSPL 
Match market Correct (Incorrect) 34 (30) .07 (.55) 15 (6) .08 (.39) 
Match market HT Correct (Incorrect) 35 (29) .06 (.51) - - 
Championship market Correct (Incorrect) 32 (32) .04 (.64) 14 (7) .08 (.43) 
ODDSET Correct (Incorrect) 31 (33) .13 (.36) 13 (8) .18 (.37) 
Eurobet Correct (Incorrect) 30 (34) .12 (.38) - - 
aSource: Schmidt and Werwatz (Chapter 16). 
 
about their favourites and avoided assigning extremely high (or low) 
probabilities to any single outcome. 
Table 6 provides some insight into the differences in predictions and 
certainty from a comparison of the favourites’ probabilities across prediction 
markets and bookmakers. The two bookmakers exhibit roughly the same degree 
of certainty and a high correlation. The pre-match and half-time predictions 
from the match market are also quite close to each other, although their 
correlation is less than that of the bookmakers. As expected, the certainty about 
its predictions was highest in the championship market.  
The implication of the high degree of certainty in the markets can be 
observed from the comparison of the prediction error produced in correctly and 
incorrectly predicted games (see Table 7). Whenever the markets’ predictions 
were correct they yielded an extremely low forecast error (0.07, 0.06 and 0.04 
per correct game), much lower than ODDSET and Eurobet (0.13 and 0.12 per 
correct game). Whenever the predictions were incorrect, however, the opposite 
is true: the markets produced a per-game forecast error that was much higher 
than the corresponding odds-setter’s error (0.55, 0.51 and 0.64 vs. 0.36 and 
0.38). This pattern is roughly the same as in the 2000 European Championship 
experiment. The high degree of certainty that was the greatest strength of the 
markets in the less surprising 2000 situation has become their greatest weakness 
in the highly surprising 2002 tournament. 
We now consider a possible explanation for the weak calibration of the 
predictions’ generated from the 2002 World Cup market. The literature has 
attributed biases in predictions to be due to a preference for the favourite and 
differences in commission (Williams and Panton, 1998). The so called reversed 
favourite-longshot bias has been observed in the baseball fixed odds betting 
market (Woodland and Woodland, 1994, 2003), which is characterised by 
comparatively low commissions. Smith et al. (2006) find a reduced favourite 
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longshot bias in exchange based betting when they compared to fixed odds in 
horse racing. Preferences for favourites on the demand side have been reported 
by Levitt (2004) who finds bettors to have a higher demand for wagers on the 
favourites in American football fixed-spread betting. 
The high degree of certainty by market participants with respect to their 
favourites goes hand in hand with a low degree of certainty for longshots (see 
Figure 1). Together with the differences in commissions—the markets did not 
charge any commission whereas ODDSET’s and Eurobet’s take is substantial—
the observed reversed favourite-longshot bias with the markets is in line with 
the predictions of Williams and Panton (1998). 
Conclusions 
In this chapter we have evaluated the predictive performance of 
experimental asset markets that were conducted during the 2002 World Cup. 
Contracts in the markets were contingent on the outcomes of football matches. 
According to the theory of efficient markets and rational expectations, contract 
prices from the markets should be the best available forecast for the outcome of 
a match since they reflect the consensus opinion of all traders about the match. 
Previous work in the field, in particular the study of Schmidt and Werwatz 
(Chapter 16) based on the 2000 European Championship, found a predictive 
performance of markets that was superior to forecasts from odds-setters.  
In this chapter we find market performance and bookmaker performance to 
be significantly different from a random predictor. In contrast to the findings 
from the preceding 2000 European Championship experiment, the market’s 
predictions were less accurate than the predictions from two expert bookmakers. 
In addition, the certainty of the market’s prediction was not significant in 
explaining the predictive success of the markets. In fact, no explanatory factor 
could be identified that was significant in explaining predictive accuracy by the 
markets. We argue that the nature of the underlying sports event is a key 
element in explaining the deviations in outcome between the two studies. The 
aggregation of all relevant a priori information about a sports event may well be 
a feasible task for markets of our type, but that does not imply that the resulting 
forecast is necessarily of superior accuracy. The ‘human’ factor remains too 
high in the football game and does at times lead to surprising outcomes as was 
quite apparent in the 2002 World Cup. Consistently with Schmidt and Werwatz 
(Chapter 16) we found the implicit probabilities derived from market prices to 
be more certain about the outcome than the probabilities derived from 
bookmakers’ odds. This certainty was met by the many surprising outcomes and 
has resulted in the poor predictive performance by the markets. The bookmakers 
on the other hand took much less extreme stakes and were not hit as hard by the 
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surprising outcomes. Betting behaviour and the degree of certainty of the 
implicit probabilities generated from market prices and bookmakers’ odds were 
remarkably alike across experiments, and we therefore favour surprise as the 
chief explanation for the difference in findings. 
The favourite-longshot bias, stating that bettors overestimate the longshots’ 
probability of winning, is well recorded in the racetrack literature. It has 
recently been investigated in another Iowa Electronic Market type experiment 
(Berg and Rietz, 2002). The authors find in their study that there exists a reverse 
favourite-longshot bias that is attributable to overconfidence among traders. As 
a consequence, contracts with relatively bad win prospects are priced 
significantly too low and vice versa. The price data from the 2002 World Cup 
markets is consistent with this finding. 
We further developed and implemented a new approach to test for the 
accuracy of market-generated predictions. Specifically we used a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for a comparison of the empirical distribution function of match 
outcomes with the distribution of all prediction market and bookmaker 
predictions. It turned out that the distribution of the market predictions was 
significantly different from the distribution of the tournament’s actual outcome. 
This is not the case with both bookmakers who are perfectly calibrated in the 
2002 World Cup. Nonetheless, the market predictions (and the bookmakers’ 
predictions) were significantly different from a random predictor. We consider 
these results to provide further support for our previous explanations. 
Further research should aim for more participation in the markets that will 
generate more data for more sophisticated analyses. In particular, the new 
opportunity to keep trading during matches has generated limited additional data 
in the 2002 World Cup experiment. Thus, we could not have made any 
meaningful analysis of how prices react to events during a game. Gil and Levitt 
(2008) use intrade data from the 2002 World Cup and study contracts while the 
game is played. They find mixed evidence for market efficiency in this market: 
prices react to goals, yet prices continue to trend higher for 10 to 15 minutes 
after the goal. We were able to show that in the context of the 2002 World Cup 
prediction market prices react with respect to predictive accuracy to new 
information inflow until half-time. Yet, this new information at half-time is not 
able to drive out the reverse favourite-longshot bias observed with market prices 
in the 2002 World Cup prediction market. 
Predicting the outcome of football matches is a highly uncertain task. An 
empirical argument was put forward by Wagenaar (1988), who argued that 
transitivity with respect to the match outcome among teams in World Cup 
games is rare. For the 2002 World Cup competition Group D might serve as an 
illustrative example where the transitivity of outcomes is violated: USA won 
over Portugal, Portugal over Poland, yet Poland succeeded over the USA. One 
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underlying reason why chance plays such a big role in football outcomes might 
be the game’s low scoring property. It remains an open issue for further 
empirical investigations whether the degree of surprise in the 2002 World Cup 
is the norm for World Cup and European Championship matches or an outlier. 
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